INTERSTATE  COMMERCE  COMMISSION 

REPORT  OF  THE  DIRECTOR  OF  THE  BUREAU  OF  SAFETY 
IN  RE  INVESTIGATION  OF  AN  ACCIDENT  WHICH 
OCCURRED  ON  THE  DENVER  &  RIO  GRANDE  WESTERN 
RAILROAD  NEAR  GRANITE,  COLO.,  ON  AUGUST  20,  1925 

October  8.  19251 
To  the  Commission: 

On  August  20,  11)25,  there  was  a  head-end  collision  between  two 
passenger  trains  on  the  Denver  &  Rio  Grande  Western  Railroad! 
near  Granite,  Colo.,  which  resulted  in  the  death  of  2  employees,  and: 
the  injury  of  96  passengers,  19  employees  of  the  railroad  company., 
and  2  Pullman  employees.  The  investigation  of  this  accident  waa 
made  in  conjunction  with  representatives  of  the  Colorado  Public 
Utilities  Commission. 

LOCATION    AND   METHOD   OF   OPERATION 

This  accident  occurred  on  subdivision  3  of  the  Salida  Division, 
extending  between  Minturn  and  Salida,  Colo.,  a  distance  of  86.85. 
miles.    In  the  vicinity  of  the  point  of  accident  this,  is  a  single-track 
line  over  which  trains  are  operated  by  time-table  and  train  orders, 
no  block-signal  system  being  in  use.    Eastbound  trains  are  superior 
to  westbound  trains  of  the  same  class.    Under  the  rules  train  orders 
on  Form  19  may  be  used  in  restricting  the  superiority  of  trains,  with 
certain  exceptions.    The  point  of  accident  was  about  iy2  miles  east 
of  Granite,  the  alignment  of  the  track  in  each  direction  consisting- 
of  a  series  of  short  curves  and  tangents.     Approaching  from  the 
east  the  last  curve  is  a  4°  curve  to  the  right  about  540  feet  in  length, 
followed  by  tangent  track  to  the  point  of  collision,  a  distance  of 
about  350  feet;  approaching  from  the  west  there  is  a  compound 
curve  to  the  left  1,178  feet  in  length  with  a  maximum  curvature  of" 
12°,  about  150  feet  of  tangent  and  then  a  12°  curve  to  the  right  365- 
feet  in  length,  followed  by  about  55  feet  of  tangent  extending  to 
the  point  of  accident.     The  grade  is  generally  ascending  for  west- 
bound trains  for  a  considerable  distance  in  each  direction  from  the 
point  of  accident,  with  the  exception  of  a  short  stretch  of  level  track 
in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  point  of  accident,  the  maximum 
grade  being  1.70  per  cent.     The  crews  of  approaching  trains  could 
not  see  each  other  a  distance  of  more  than  i^WV.fQk  Fl    Ul. 

The  weather  was  cloudy  at  the  tinje  o&^J.to§fflL8b&Wbfr  oc 
curred  at  2.58  p.  m. 


65589—25 


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2  INTERSTATE    COMMERCE    COMMISSION 

DESCRIPTION 

Westbound  passenger  train  No.  7  consisted  of  one  baggage  car,  one 
private  car,  five  sleeping  cars,  two  dining  cars,  three  sleeping  cars,  and 
one  observation  sleeping  car,  in  the  order  named,  hauled  by  engines 
759  and  787,  and  was  in  charge  of  Conductor  Conway  and  Engine- 
men  Willingham  and  Duncan.  The  second,  eighth,  and  ninth  cars 
were  of  steel-underframe  construction,  the  remainder  being  of  all- 
steel  construction.  At  Salida,  42.2  miles  from  Granite,  the  crew  in 
charge  received  a  clearance  card,  together  with  a  copy  of  train  order 
No.  65,  Form  19,  reading  as  follows : 

No.  7  Engs  787-759  wait  at  Brown  Canon  until  one  thirty  five  1.35  p.  m. 
Arena  one  forty  five  1.45  p.  m.  for  Exa  1186  east,  hold  main  track  meet  No. 
8  Eng  778  at  Pine  Creek. 

Pine  Creek  is  5.1G  miles  east  of  Granite.  Train  No.  7  left  Salida 
at  1.19  p.  m.,  44  minutes  late,  and  when  passing  Buena  Vista,  16.99 
miles  from  Granite  and  the  last  open  office,  the  crew  received  a 
clearance  card  together  with  train  orders  Nos.  67,  71,  and  72,  all  on 
Form  19,  these  orders  reading  as  follows : 

No.  67— 

No.  7  Engs  787-759  run  twenty  five  25  mins  late  Americus  to  Waco.  Twenty 
20  mins  late  Waco  to  Malta.     Fifteen  15  mins  late  Malta  to  Tenn.  Pass. 

No.  71— 

No.  8  Eng  778  take  siding  meet  No.  7  Engs  759-787  at  Granite  instead  of 
Pine  Creek. 

No.  72— 

No.  7  Engs  759-7S7  wait  at  Pine  Creek  until  two  thirty  six  2.36  p.  m. 

Train  No.  7  passed  Buena  Vista  at  2.14  p.  m.,  34  minutes  late, 
passed  Pine  Creek,  and  was  approaching  Granite  moving  at  a  speed 
of  about  18  miles  an  hour  when  it  collided  with  train  No.  8. 

Eastbound  passenger  train  No.  8  consisted  of  one  combination  car, 
five  sleeping  cars,  two  dining  cars,  five  sleeping  cars,  and  one  observa- 
tion sleeping  car,  hauled  by  engine  778,  and  was  in  charge  of  Con- 
ductor McGary  and  Engineman  Clare.  The  seventh  and  eighth 
cars  were  of  steel-underframe  construction,  the  remainder  being 
of  all-steel  construction.  On  the  arrival  of  this  train  at  Ten- 
nessee Pass,  23.68  miles  from  Granite,  the  crew  in  charge  received 
a  clearance  card,  together  with  copies  of  train  orders  Nos.  56,  65, 
(69,  and  72,  all  on  Form  19.  Train  order  No.  65  was  worded 
the  same  as  the  train  order  of  that  number  delivered  to  the  crew  of 
train  No.  7.    Train  orders  Nos.  56,  69,  and  72  read  as  follows : 

No.  56— 

No.  8  Eng  778  wait  at  Tenn.  Pass  until  one  forty  1.40  p.  m.  Keddar  one 
forty-seven   1.47   p  .in.   Malta   one   fifty  six   1.56   p.   in.   Snowden   two   two  2.02 


ACCIDENT  NEAR  GRANITE,  COLO.  3 

p.  in.  Kobe  two  seven  2.07  p.  m.  Granite  two  fifteen  2.15  p.  m.  Riverside  two 
twenty  eight  2.28  p.  m.  Buena  Vista  two  thirty  nine  2.39  p.  m.  Nathrop  two 
forty  nine  2.49  p.  m.  Arena  two  fifty  nine  2.59  p.  m.  Brown  Canon  three  eight 
3. OS  p.  m.  Belleview  three  thirteen  3.13  p.  ra. 

No.  69— 

No.  S  Eng  778  run  twenty  20  mins  late  on  order  No.  56  Tenn.  Pass  to  Salida. 

No.  72— 

No.  8  Eng  778  run  thirty  five  35  mins  late  on  order  No.  56  Tenn.  Pass  t<» 
Salida. 

A  copy  of  train  order  No.  71,  previously  quoted,  had  been  put 
out  by  dispatcher  to  the  operator  at  Tennessee  Pass  for  the  crew 
of  train  No.  8,  but  this  order  was  not  delivered.  Train  No.  8 
departed  from  Tennessee  Pass  at  2.19  p.  m.,  3  hours  and  29  minutes 
late  on  its  time-table  schedule  and  39  minutes  late  on  train  order 
No.  56,  received  a  clearance  when  passing  Malta,  passed  Granite 
at  2.55  p.  m.,  3  hours  and  11  minutes  late  on  its  time-table  schedule 
and  40  minutes  late  on  train  order  No.  56,  and  collided  with  train 
No.  7  at  a  point  east  of  Granite  while  traveling  at  a  speed  estimated 
to  have  been  about  30  miles  an  hour. 

Engine  759,  the  lead  engine  of  train  No.  7,  was  derailed,  but 
remained  in  an  upright  position,  with  its  own  tender,  together  with 
engine  787,  on  top  of  it ;  none  of  the  cars  in  train  No.  7  was  derailed 
or  seriously  damaged.  Engine  778  and  the  first  four  cars  in  train 
No.  8  were  derailed,  but  remained  upright.  All  of  the  engines  were 
considerably  damaged.  The  employees  killed  were  the  fireman  of 
train  No.  8  and  the  fireman  of  the  second  engine  of  train  No.  7. 

SUMMARY  OF  EVIDENCE 

According  to  Operator  Rehklau,  on  duty  at  Tennessee  Pass,  he 
received  train  orders  Nos.  56,  65,  69,  71,  and  72,  all  of  these  being  for 
delivery  to  the  crew  of  train  No.  8.  The  first  four  of  these  orders 
were  separated  ready  for  delivery  when  he  received  train  order 
No.  72;  and  after  receiving  this  order,  directing  train  No.  8  to  run 
35  minutes  late  on  train  order  No.  56,  he  decided  to  file  train  order 
No.  69,  which  directed  No.  8  to  run  20  minutes  late,  but  through 
error  he  took  out  the  copies  of  train  order  No.  71,  threw  away  the 
carbon  copies,  and  filed  the  original.  He  then  filled  out  the  clear- 
ance from  the  orders  he  then  had  on  hand,  entering  on  it  the  num- 
bers of  those  orders,  and  he  said  that  he  read  off  the  numbers  from 
the  clearance  card  when  repeating  them  to  the  dispatcher,  reading 
them  from  right  to  left;  that  is,  in  the  following  order:  72,  69,  65, 
and  56,  and  he  said  he  did  not  include  train  order  No.  71  among 
those  numbers  which  he  repeated  to  the  dispatcher.     He  said  he 


4  INTERSTATE    COMMERCE    COMMISSION 

received  the  dispatcher's  O.  K.  to  the  clearance  and  that  he  did  not 
know  train  order  Xo.  71  bad  not  been  delivered  until  the  dispatcher 
called  him  on  the  telephone  at  about  the  time  the  accident  occurred. 
Operator  Rehklau  further  stated  that  he  intended  to  file  train  order 
No.  69  without  receiving  instructions  to  do  so,  and  that  this  had  been 
done  so  often  in  previous  eases  as  to  make  it  almost  a  matter  of 
regular  procedure.  He  admitted  that  the  proper  way  would  have 
been  to  have  had  the  order  annulled  by  the  dispatcher.  In  this  con- 
nection he  made  the  statement  that  the  dispatcher  made  the  remark, 
"  You  are  not  giving  them  both  of  those  run-late  orders,"  or  words 
to  that  effect,  and  that  he  replied  in  the  negative;  this  conversation, 
however,  was  after  he  had  filed  the  order. 

Dispatcher  Smith,  on  duty  at  the  time  of  the  accident,  said  that 
previous  to  that  day  the  telegraph  office  at  Granite  had  been  closed 
at  1  p.  in.,  that  when  he  came  on  duty  at  8  a.  m.  that  day  the  dis- 
patcher he  was  to  relieve  was  extremely  busy,  and  that  he  himself 
sat  down  to  work  without  going  through  the  bulletins,  etc.,  and 
therefore  did  not  know  that  the  hours  of  the  office  at  Granite  had 
been  changed,  as  a  result  of  which  the  office  would  be  open  until 
4  p.  m.,  his1  first  knowledge  of  this  fact  being  when  the  operator  at 
Granite  called  him  on  the  telephone  for  some  purpose  which  he  did 
not  recall.  Shortly  afterwards  he  gave  Operator  Berger,  on  duty 
at  Granite,  a  train  order  for  delivery  to  the  crew  of  train  No.  7,  this 
being  at  about  2.25  p.  m.,  but  told  him  not  to  hang  out  the  yellow  flag 
used  to  indicate  that  there  are  orders  on  Form  19  to  be  delivered  to 
the  crew  of  an  approaching  train,  inasmuch  as  train  No.  8  was  going 
to  take  the  siding  and  meet  train  No.  7  at  that  point,  and  he  was 
afraid  that  if  the  engineman  of  train  No.  8  saw  the  yellow  flag  dis- 
played he  would  conclude  that  the  meeting  point  had  been  changed 
and  would  approach  the  station  on  the  main  track  instead  of  entering 
the  passing  track  at  the  west  switch.  Dispatcher  Smith  also  told 
Operator  Berger  to  let  him  know  when  train  No.  8  arrived  and  that 
he  would  tell  him  when  to  hang  out  the  yellow  flag  for  train  No.  7. 
Sometime  later  Operator  Berger  called  him  on  the  telephone  and 
said  he  had  heard  the  whistle  of  train  No.  7,  and  he  told  the  operator 
that  it  must  have  been  train  No.  8  as  train  No.  7  had  not  had  time 
to  reach  Granite.  Operator  Berger  then  told  him  train  No.  8  was 
approaching  on  the  main  track  and  inquired  if  he  should  stop  it,  and 
Dispatcher  Smith  said  he  at  once  told  the  operator  to  place  the 
train-order  board  in  the  stop  position  and  to  go  out  and  stop  the 
train,  his  first  idea  being  that  the  crew  of  train  No.  8  had  over- 
looked that  part  of  their  meet  order  requiring  them  to  take  the  siding. 
Shortly  afterwards  Operator  Berger  returned  to  the  telephone  and 
told  him  he  thought  he  had  stopped  the  train,  saying  he  had  placed 


ACCIDENT  NEAR  GRANITE,  COLO.  5 

the  train-order  board  in  the  stop  position  and  also  had  given  the 
flagman  of  train  No.  8  an  emergency  stop  signal,  Tn  the  meantime 
Dispatdhei-  Smith  called  Operator  Rehklau  at  Tennessee  Pass,  asked 
him  if  he  had  given  train  order  No.  71  to  the  crew  of  train  No.  S, 
and  at  this  time  found  that  the  crew  did  not  have  the  order. 

While  Operator  Rehklau  said  that  in  reading  the  numbers  of  the 
orders  to  the  dispatcher  he  read  them  in  the  following  order:  72,  69, 
65;  and  56,  yet  in  the  dispatcher's  train-order  book  the  numbers  of 
the  orders  appeared  as  follows:  71,  72,  69,  65,  and  56.  Dispatcher 
Smith  said  the  dispatchers  endeavored  to  have  the  operators  give  the 
numbers  in  numerical  order,  beginning  with  the  highest  number, 
and  when  asked  how  train  order  No.  71  appeared  in  his  train-order 
book  preceding  train  order  No.  72  he  replied  that  he  copied  the 
numbers  exactly  as  repeated  by  Operator  Rehklau  and  that  in  his 
opinion  the  operator  had  separated  from  the  other  orders  the  one 
which  he  thought  was  train  order  No.  69  but  which  was  actually 
train  order  No.  71  and  placed  it  on  top  of  the  others,  intending  to 
ask  the  dispatcher  for  an  annulment,  and  then  when  reading  the 
numbers  to  the  dispatcher  preparatoiw  to  clearing  the  train  he  read 
the  number  of  this  order  first  followed  by  the  others.  He  also  said 
Operator  Rehklau  made  the  remark  that  he  had  one  order  which 
was  going  to  be  annulled.  Dispatcher  Smith  further  stated  that 
ordinarity  when  orders  are  not  to  be  delivered  to  trains  an  annul- 
ment order  is  issued  to  the  operator,  but  that  he  had  known  of  a 
few  cases  where  such  annulment  orders  were  not  issued.  He  did  not 
recall  any  conversation  with  Operator  Rehklau  in  which  he  sug- 
gested to  the  operator  in  any  way  that  train  order  No.  69  should 
be  filed. 

When  asked  why  he  did  not  put  out  train  order  No.  71  at  the 
meeting  point,  Dispatcher  Smith  said  it  was  because  he  did  not 
know  the  office  at  Granite  was  open.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  however, 
there  was  ample  opportunity,  had  he  so  desired,  of  giving  the  order 
to  the  operator  at  Granite  after  he  ascertained  that  the  office  was 
open,  and  it  developed  that  during  the  12  years  he  had  been  em- 
ployed as  a  dispatcher  he  had  never  used  the  so-called  middle  order 
and  that,  although  he  had  never  brought  this  matter  to  the  attention 
of  the  management,  yet  Mr.  Carter,  a  trainmaster,  had  inspected 
the  train-order  books  and  had  never  taken  exception  to  the  failure  to 
use  the  middle  order. 

Tennessee  Pass  is  a  registering  station  as  well  as  a  point  at  which 
trains  are  inspected,  and  under  such  circumstances  trains  are  likely 
to  be  at  that  point  for  a  period  of  several  minutes.  Dispatcher 
Smith  was  asked  why,  in  view  of  this  fact,  it  would  not  have  been 
an  additional  safeguard  to  have  used  an  order  on  Form  31  when 


6  INTERSTATE    COMMERCE    COMMISSION 

changing  the  meeting  point  between  trains  Nos.  7  and  8,  thereby 
still  further  restricting  the  rights  of  the  superior  train,  and  he 
said  it  might  have  been  an  additional  safeguard,  and  when  asked 
if  it  would  not  have  prevented  the  accident  he  said  it  might  have 
gone  a  long  way  in  that  direction,  but  that  under  the  new  book 
of  rules,  which  took  effect  on  March  1,  1925,  he  felt  he  was  carry- 
ing out  the  wishes  of  the  management  in  issuing  the  order  on 
Form  19  and  that  the  rules  were  put  in  effect  for  the  primary  pur- 
pose of  using  orders  on  Form  19  wherever  possible  in  order  to  save 
the  time  which  would  be  required  were  it  necessary  to  obtain  signa- 
tures to  train  orders  written  on  Form  31. 

Dispatcher  Olsen,  on  duty  in  the  office  with  Dispatcher  Smith, 
said  that  by  means  of  the  loud  speaker  with  which  the  office  is 
equipped,  he  was  able  to  hear  enough  of  what  the  operator  at 
Granite  told  Dispatcher  Smith  to  realize  that  there  was  something 
wrong,  and  on  inquiring  as  to  the  nature  of  the  trouble  he  was 
told  that  train  No.  8  had  passed  its  meeting  point  with  train  No.  7. 
After  a  very  short  delay  Dispatcher  Smith  asked  him  to  call  the 
chief  dispatcher,  and  on  returning  to  the  room  with  the  chief  dis- 
patcher they  looked  at  the  train-order  book  and  the  record  of  the 
clearance  received  by  train  No.  8  at  Tennessee  Pass,  Dispatcher 
Smith  having  called  attention  to  the  clearance  with  the  remark  that 
he  did  not  see  how  the  difficulty  arose,  since  the  train-order  book 
showed  that  train  No.  8  had  received  a  copy  of  train  order  No. 
71.  Dispatcher  Olsen  said  train  order  No.  71  was  the  first  to  be 
listed  and  that  he  did  not  notice  anything  to  indicate  that  the 
writing  was  not  in  the  same  handwriting,  or  that  anything  had 
been  added  to  what  was  originally  written  in  the  book. 

Chief  Dispatcher  Hulse  said  he  looked  at  the  train-order  book 
almost  immediately  after  entering  the  room  and  found  that  the 
numbers  of  the  orders  were  shown  in  the  book,  and  apparently  there 
was  nothing  wrong  with  the  manner  in  which  train  No.  8  had  been 
cleared  at  Tennessee  Pass.  Mr.  Hulse  said  it  was  the  practice,  when 
not  desirable  to  give  an  order  to  the  crew  of  a  train  after  it  had 
been  issued  to  the  operator,  to  annul  the  order  by  an  order  addressed 
to  the  operator.  Mr.  Hulse  said  he  had  heard  a  dispatcher  tell  an 
operator  to  file  an  order,  and  that  whenever  he  had  heard  such  in- 
structions given  he  had  criticized  the  dispatcher  very  severely.  One 
of  the  duties  of  the  chief  dispatcher  is  to  check  train-order  books,  but 
Mr.  Hulse  said  it  had  been  several  months  since  he  had  performed 
this  duty  as  there  had  been  other  duties  which  occupied  all  of  his 
time.  Whenever  such  checks  had  been  made  in  the  past  he  had 
failed  to  find  evidence  of  negligence  on  the  part  of  Dispatcher 
Smith,  and  he  considered  the  latter  to  be  a  competent  dispatcher. 
Chief  Dispatcher  Hulse  was  aware  of  the  fact  that  the  middle  order 


ACCIDENT  NEAR  GRANITE,  COLO.  7 

was  not  used  but  had  never  objected  to  this  failure  to  obey  the  rules 
simply  for  the  reason  that  it  was  not  customary  to  use  this  order. 
On  the  day  of  the  accident  the  Denver  office  inquired  as  to  whether 
or  not  instructions  were  in  effect  to  use  the  middle  order  and  then 
told  him  to  place  such  instructions  in  effect  immediately.  He  con- 
sidered the  middle  order  to  be  a  precaution  which  should  be  exer- 
cised wherever  possible  and  to  be  the  only  precaution  they  had  which 
would  guard  against  an  error  such  as  the  failure  of  an  operator  to 
deliver  an  order,  but  he  further  stated  that  in  the  majority  of  cases 
a  middle  order  could  not  be  used  even  if  desired  on  account  of  the 
fact  that  the  meeting  points  were  at  blind  sidings. 

Operator  Berger.  on  duty  at  Granite,  said  he  received  the  train 
order  for  delivery  to  the  crew  of  train  No.  7  and  was  instructed  not 
to  display  the  yellow  flag  until  train  No.  8  was  into  clear.  When 
train  No.  8  approached  Granite  the  engineman  sounded  the  whistle, 
and  Operator  Berger  told  the  dispatcher  train  No.  7  was  coming; 
the  dispatcher  at  once  said  it  was  train  No.  8,  and  on  looking  west- 
ward Operator  Berger  saw  the  rear  portion  of  train  No.  8  as  it 
passed  around  a  curve.  As  he  had  no  orders  for  train  No.  8  he  at 
once  cleared  the  train-order  board.  Operator  Berger  said  he  then 
looked  eastward  to  watch  for  the  approach  of  train  No.  7,  as  he  had 
an  order  to  deliver  to  that  train,  and  when  the  engine  of  train  No.  8 
reached  the  station  he  turned  and  looked  in  that  direction  and  then 
sawT  that  the  train  was  on  the  main  track  instead  of  on  the  passing 
track.  Operator  Berger  said  he  at  once  notified  the  dispatcher  of 
this  fact  and  also  told  him  it  did  not  appear  that  the  train  was 
going  to  stop  and  inquired  if  he  should  stop  the  train,  to  which  the 
dispatcher  replied  in  the  affirmative.  Operator  Berger  said  he  at 
once  restored  the  train-order  board  to  the  stop  position  and  then  ran 
out  of  the  door  to  the  station  platform.  By  this  time  the  rear  por- 
tion of  the  train  was  passing  the  station  and  with  his  hand  he  gave  an 
emergency  stop  signal  to  the  flagman,  who  was  on  the  lower  steps  at 
the  head  end  of  the  rear  car.  Operator  Berger  said  the  flagman 
looked  at  the  train-order  board  and  then  looked  at  him  as  he  gave 
the  stop  signal,  after  which  the  flagman  went  up  the  steps  into  the 
car,  and  the  operator  said  this  action  on  the  part  of  the  flagman  made 
him  feel  certain  that  the  train  was  going  to  be  stopped.  After  the 
accident  Flagman  Willis,  of  train  No.  8.  returned  to  the  station  and 
Operator  Berger  said  he  went  to  meet  the  flagman  and  asked  him 
why  he  did  not  apply  the  air  brakes  by  means  of  the  conductor's 
valve,  and  he  said  the  flagman  replied  that  he  was  unable  to  do  so. 
On  returning  to  the  telegraph  office  he  told  the  flagman  the  train- 
order  board  had  been  thrown  to  the  stop  position  and  that  he  had 
given  the  flagman  a  stop  signal  and  again  asked  him  why  he  did 
not  stop  the  train  and  he  said  the  flagman  again  replied  by  saying 


3  INTERSTATE    COMMERCE    COMMISSION 

lie  was  unable  to  do  so.  Operator  Berber  had  a  red  flag  rolled  up  and 
placed  on  hooks  under  his  desk,  but  he  said  he  did  not  think  about 
using  it,  devoting  his  attention  to  getting  out  on  the  platform  before 
the  entire  train  had  passed  the  station.  Operator  Berger  further 
stated  that  an  inspection  train  had  been  at  Granite  within  the  past 
few  months,  at  which  time  a  trainmaster  inspected  the  location  of 
the  flagging  equipment,  and  he  said  it  seemed  to  meet  with  the  ap- 
proval of  that  official. 

Mrs.  Berger,  the  wife  of  the  operator,  said  she  went  into  the  sta- 
tion after  train  No.  8  had  passed  and  that  shortly  afterwards  Flag- 
man Willis  came  back  to  the  office,  and  when  Operator  Berger  re- 
marked to  him  that  he  felt  sure  the  train  would  stop  the  flagman 
replied  that  he  had  been  unable  to  stop  it. 

Flagman  Willis,  of  train  No.  8,  said  he  was  on  the  steps  at  the 
forward  end  of  the  rear  car,  that  he  saw  the  train-order  board  drop 
to  the  clear  position  before  the  engine  reached  the  station,  and  that 
it  was  still  in  the  clear  position  when  he  passed  it,  at  which  time  the 
>peed  of  the  train  was  about  25  or  30  miles  an  hour,  while  Operator 
Berger  was  inside  of  the  office.  Flagman  Willis  said  he  did  not  see 
the  operator  give  a  stop  signal  of  any  kind,  and  after  the  train  had 
passed  the  station  he  went  back  up  the  steps  and  closed  the  trap 
door  of  the  vestibule.  Flagman  Willis  did  not  remember  any  conver- 
sation with  the  operator  after  the  accident  except  that  after  finding 
out  what  the  difficulty  was  he  said  he  asked  the  operator  if  he  had 
the  order  for  the  two  trains  to  meet  at  Granite.  He  denied  that  the 
operator  said  anything  to  him  about  placing  the  train-order  board 
in  the  stop  position  or  giving  him  a  stop  signal  with  his  hands. 

Engineman  Clare,  of  train  No.  8,  said  he  had  an  order  to  meet 
train  No.  7  at  Pine  Creek,  the  first  station  east  of  Granite,  that  the 
train-order  board  at  Granite  was  not  cleared  until  his  engine  was 
close  to  the  station,  and  that  he  then  began  to  work  steam  in  an 
endeavor  to  increase  speed  as  quickly  as  possible.  He  thought  the 
speed  of  his  train  was  nearly  45  miles  an  hour  when  he  first  saw  a 
puff  of  smoke  from  the  engine  hauling  train  No.  7  and  he  said  he 
at  once  shut  off  steam,  applied  the  air  brakes  in  emergency,  called 
to  the  fireman  and  jumped.  Both  Engineman  Clare  and  Conductor 
McGary  stated  that  at  Tennessee  Pass  they  received  all  the  orders 
called  for  by  the  clearance  card  and  that  they  knew  nothing  about 
train  order  No.  71. 

Conductor  McGary  was  riding  in  the  first  car  in  the  train  when 
passing  the  station  at  Granite,  and  at  that  time  he  saw  Operator 
Berger  seated  at  his  desk  in  the  office.  He  did  not  notice  any  attempt 
made  by  the  operator  to  stop  the  train  after  the  engine  had  passed 
tin-  train-order  board.     Conductor  McGary  estimated  the  speed  of 


ACCIDENT  NEAR  GRANITE,  COLO.  9 

his  train  at  the  time  of  the  collision  to  have  been  25  or  30  miles 
an  hour.  Brakeman  DeVoss,  who  was  riding  in  the  same  car  with 
Conductor  McGary,  said  he  looked  back  when  about  six  or  seven 
car  lengths  beyond  the  train-order  board  and  that  at  that  time  the 
board  was  still  in  the  clear  position.  His  other  statements  were 
generally  the  same  as  those  of  Conductor  McGary. 

Engineman  Willingham,  of  the  lead  engine  of  train  No.  7,  was 
unable  to  make  a  statement  at  the  investigation  on  account  of  in- 
juries received  in  the  accident.  Fireman  Roberts,  also  of  the  lead 
engine,  said  he  had  finished  putting  in  a  fire,  and  on  getting  upon 
his  seat  box  he  saw  train  No.  8  apparently  only  a  few  car  lengths 
distant.  Engineman  Duncan,  in  charge  of  the  second  engine,  said 
that  on  account  of  the  curvature  of  the  track  he  was  unable  to  see 
train  No.  8  approaching  and  that  his  first  knowledge  of  anything 
wrong  was  when  he  felt  a  jar  as  if  the  air  brakes  had  been  applied; 
at  first  he  thought  the  train  had  been  derailed,  and  he  did  not  know 
there  had  been  a  collision  with  another  train  until  he  got  off  the 
engine  after  it  had  come  to  a  stop.  He  estimated  the  speed  of  his 
train  to  have  been  about  18  miles  an  hour.  The  statements  of  Con- 
ductor Conway  and  Brakemen  Corrigan  and  Strott,  all  of  train  No. 
7,  did  not  bring  out  any  additional  facts  of  importance. 

Trainmaster  Carter  said  that  from  June,  1919,  until  February  16, 
1925,  he  had  been  employed  as  supervisor  of  safety  and  fire  preven- 
tion. In  January,  1924,  he  was  given  instructions  that  when  he  had 
an  opportunity^  he  was  to  check  the  dispatchers'  train-order  books 
for  the  purpose  of  seeing  whether  or  not  train  orders  were  being 
issued  in  accordance  with  the  rules.  It  also  appeared  that  during 
all  of  the  period  between  Januar}7,  1924,  and  February  16,  1925,  he 
reported  directly  to  the  general  manager.  Mr.  Carter  stated  that  he 
examined  train-order  books  about  once  a  month  and  that  when  he 
first  began  checking  the  books  he  found  irregularities,  which  he 
handled  in  writing  with  the  chief  dispatcher,  with  a  copy  going  to 
the  superintendent,  while  the  general  manager  was  also  notified. 
These  reports  mentioned  the  books  checked,  dates,  and  irregularities 
found  to  exist.  He  thought  the  last  time  he  checked  the  train-order 
books  at  Salida  was  in  January.  1925,  and  he  said  he  had  never  found 
that  the  middle  order  was  not  being  used  where  practicable,  nor 
did  he  ever  find  that  orders  were  being  filed  by  operators  without 
first  having  been  annulled.  He  was  unable  to  recall  any  specific 
instances  of  violations  of  rules  in  the  transmission,  receiving,  or 
delivery  of  orders  which  he  had  discovered  as  a  result  of  his  inspec- 
tions. At  the  time  of  the  investigation  of  this  accident  Mr.  Carter 
was  a  trainmaster  on  a  double-track  division,  so  that  he  did  not 
feel  qualified  to  speak  with  regard  to  present  violations  of  the  rule 
requiring  the  use  of  middle  orders. 


10  INTERSTATE    COMMERCE    COMMISSION 

CONCLUSIONS 

This  accident  was  caused  by  the  failure  of  Operator  Rehklau,  on 
duty  at  Tennessee  Pass,  to  deliver  a  copy  of  train  order  Xo.  71  to 
the  crew  of  train  No.  8,  and  by  the  failure  of  the  responsible  operat- 
ing officials  to  enforce  the  rules  governing  the  handling  of  train 
orders. 

Operator  Rehklau  had  received  a  copy  of  train  order  Xo.  71, 
changing  the  meeting  point  between  trains  Xos.  8  and  7  from  Pine 
Creek  to  Granite ;  when  train  order  Xo.  72  was  received,  directing 
train  Xo.  8  to  run  35  minutes  late,  he  decided  to  file  train  order 
Xo.  69,  which  had  directed  train  Xo.  8  to  run  20  minutes  late,  but 
instead  of  doing  this  he  filed  train  order  Xo.  71  by  mistake  and 
delivered  train  order  Xo.  69.  Operator  Rehklau  stated  that  he 
entered  on  the  clearance  card  the  numbers  of  the  order  he  then  had 
for  delivery  to  the  crew  of  train  Xo.  8,  which  were  Xos.  56,  65,  69, 
and  72,  and  reported  them  to  the  dispatcher,  reading  them  in  order 
from  right  to  left.  On  the  dispatcher's  train-order  book,  however,, 
the  numbers  of  the  orders  appeared  in  the  following  order:  71,  72. 
69,  65,  and  56.  There  is  a  direct  conflict  between  the  statements  of 
the  dispatcher  and  the  operator  as  to  whether  or  not  the  operator 
repeated  the  number  of  train  order  Xo.  71  as  among  those  he  was 
going  to  deliver  to  the  crew  of  train  Xo.  8.  Operator  Rehklau  fur- 
ther stated  that  he  acted  on  his  own  responsibility  in  filing  the  train 
order  without  receiving  an  annulment  of  the  same  and  that  this 
method  had  been  followed  on  previous  occasions.  That  this  may 
have  been  true  was  somewhat  apparent  from  an  examination  of  the 
train-order  book  covering  the  orders  issued  on  August  18,  on  which 
date  trains  were  cleared  at  two  different  stations  without  having 
received  orders  which  had  been  issued,  which  orders  had  not  been 
annulled. 

The  rules  of  this  railroad  require  that  a  copy  of  a  meet  order  be 
addressed  to  the  operator  at  the  meeting  point  wherever  practicable. 
A  copy  of  train  order  Xo.  71  was  not  sent  to  the  operator  at  the 
meeting  point,  the  dispatcher  not  knowing  that  the  station  was  open 
at  the  time  this  order  was  issued.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  however,  it 
appeared  from  the  record  that  that  part  of  rule  208  requiring  the 
use  of  middle  orders  had  not  been  enforced  for  a  period  of  several 
years.  It  further  appeared  that  the  only  reason  that  the  dispatcher 
did  not  know  that  the  office  was  open  was  because  he  had  not  taken 
the  trouble  to  look  in  the  compartment  in  the  desk  where  bulletin 
notices  are  placed  daily  in  order  that  dispatchers  may  be  kept  fully 
informed  of  what   is  occurring.     Proper  enforcement  of  the   rule 


ACCIDENT  NEAR  GRANITE,  COLO.  11 

requiring  the  placing  of  middle  orders  probably  would  have  pre- 
vented the  occurrence  of  this  accident. 

Rule  202  requires  that  each  train  order  must  be  given  in  the  same 
words  to  all  employees  or  trains  addressed.  When  transmitting 
train  order  No.  72,  however,  the  dispatcher  sent  one  part  of  it  to  the 
crew  of  train  No.  8  and  the  other  part  to  the  crew  of  train  No.  7, 
with  the  result  that  while  his  records  of  the  clearances  issued  by  the 
operators  to  the  respective  trains  showed  that  they  received  train 
order  No.  72,  yet  neither  crew  actually  received  train  order  No.  72 
as  it  appeared  in  the  train-order  book. 

Under  the  rules  in  effect  prior  to  March  1,  1925,  it  was  provided 
in  the  last  paragraph  of  rule  211  that  a  train  order  on  Form  19 
could  not  be  used  to  restrict  the  rights  of  trains.  Train  order  No. 
71,  however,  restricting  the  rights  of  train  No.  8,  was  issued  on 
Form  19,  this  being  in  accordance  with  the  rules  as  they  appear  in 
a  new  book  of  rules  which  took  effect  on  March  1,  1925.  This  par- 
ticular rule  in  question,  No.  211-B,  reads  as  follows  : 

A  "  19  "  train  order  may  be  used  for  restricting  the  superiority  of  a  train, 
but  tbe  "  31 "  order  form  must  be  used  in  the  following  cases : 

(A)  As  required  in  Rule  4-A. 

(B)  When  necessary  to  restrict  the  superiority  of  a  train  which  is  at  a  blind 
siding  or  closed  office. 

(C)  As  required  in  Rule  208-A. 

(D)  When  necessary  to  restrict  a  train  which  has  been  cleared.     (Rule  219.) 

(E)  When  reducing  time  order. 

(F)  When  necessary  to  notify  trains  of  obstructions  or  extremely  abnormal 
conditions  of  track  or  bridges. 

(G)  When  moving  against  the  current  of  traffic  on  double  track.  (Train 
order  Form  R.) 

(H)  When  using  a  section  of  double  track  as  single  track.  (Train  order 
Form  S.) 

Rule  4-A  relates  to  the  issuing  of  new  time-tables;  Rule  208-A 
requires  the  use  of  a  train  order  on  Form  31  when,  in  a  single-track 
territory,  a  train  order  is  sent  to  one  of  two  opposing  trains  at  a  point 
where  the  superiority  of  the  particular  train  is  restricted. 

The  operation  of  trains  in  a  mountainous  country  requires  the 
highest  degree  of  care,  and  when,  as  in  this  case,  the  railroad  in 
question  is  a  single-track  line  with  no  block-signal  system  in  use, 
and,  as  stated  by  the  chief  dispatcher,  the  majority  of  the  meeting 
points  are  at  blind  sidings,  then  it  is  a  matter  of  absolute  necessity 
that  the  dispatcher  know  beyond  any  question  or  doubt  that  train 
orders  have  been  properly  delivered  and  are  thoroughly  understood 
by  those  who  are  to  execute  them.  Such  was  not  the  case  in  this 
instance.     Had  train  order  No.  71  been  addressed  to  the  crew  of 


12  INTERSTATE    COMMERCE   COMMISSION 

train  No.  8  on  Form  31  it  is  probable  that  this  accident  would  not 
have  occurred. 

Incidental  to  the  examination  of  the  train-order  book  in  connec- 
tion with  the  orders  involved  in  this  accident,  several  irregularities 
were  noted  which  occurred  on  the  second  day  previous  thereto,  among 
which,  besides  violations  of  the  rule  requiring  the  use  of  the  middle 
order,  were  the  following:  The  second  section  of  a  first-class  train 
was  cleared  at  a  certain  station  after  receiving  orders,  but  there  was 
nothing  in  the  train-order  book  to  show  that  it  had  been  cleared; 
several  orders  restricting  the  rights  of  trains  were  put  out  on  Form 
19  at  the  points  where  such  rights  were  restricted,  whereas  they 
should  have  been  on  Form  31,  both  under  the  former  and  under  the 
present  rules  of  this  railroad.  It  also  appeared  that  while  train  order 
No.  6  of  August  18  was  addressed  to  train  No.  61  at  Salida,  the  train 
was  cleared  without  the  order,  and  there  was  nothing  in  the  train- 
order  book  to  show  that  the  order  had  been  annulled.  The  same  situ- 
ation existed  in  the  case  of  train  order  No.  54  of  the  same  date  issued 
to  train  No.  8  at  Tennessee  Pass.  It  was  also  noted  that  on  August 
17  there  were  two  different  orders  bearing  the  same  number.  A 
check  was  made  of  the  train-order  book  covering  a  period  of  a  few 
days  in  October,  1924,  at  a  time  when  Trainmaster  Carter  was  sup- 
posed to  be  checking  these  books,  apparently  without  finding  any- 
thing other  than  minor  irregularities;  this  was  before  the  new  rules 
took  effect.  Within  a  period  of  five  days  10  orders  were  issued 
which  violated  either  the  rule  requiring  the  use  of  a  middle  order  or 
the  rule  requiring  an  order  to  be  written  on  Form  31  when  restrict- 
ing the  rights  of  a  superior  train;  some  of  these  10  orders  embraced 
violations  of  both  of  these  rules. 

It  would  be  difficult  to  imagine  a  more  inherently  dangerous  sysr 
tern,  or  lack  of  system,  for  the  operation  of  trains  under  the  train- 
order  method  of  operation  than  that  which  appears  to  exist  on  this 
railroad.  The  disastrous  results  usually  attendant  upon  careless 
handling  of  train  orders  are  well  illustrated  in  the  present  case,  and 
the  number  and  character  of  the  violations  of  the  rules  governing  the 
handling  of  train  orders  raises  a  question  as  to  whether  the  operating 
officials  of  this  railroad  have  a  proper  appreciation  of  the  responsibili- 
ties of  their  positions.  While  the  immediate  cause  may  be  found  to 
rest  with  the  failure  of  some  individual  occupying  a  comparatively 
minor  position,  those  responsible  for  the  general  conditions  result- 
ing in  such  failure  oc  upv  higher  positions.  They  have  (he  duty 
first  to  provide  safe  and  adequate  rules  for  the  operation  of  trains 
and  then  to  enforce  obedience  to  those  rules  on  the  part  of  all  con- 


ACCIDENT  NEAR  GRANITE,  COLO.  13 

cerned.     This  was  not  done  in  this  case,  and  for  their  failure  they 
are  equally  responsible  for  the  occurrence  of  this  accident. 

Had  an  adequate  block-signal  system  been  in  use  on  this  line  this 
accident  probably  would  not  have  occurred;  an  adequate  train  stop 
or  (rain-control  device  would  have  prevented  it. 

The  employees  involved  were  experienced  men,  and  at  the  time 
of  the  accident  none  of  them  had  been  on  duty  in  violation  of  any  of 
the  provisions  of  the  hours  of  service  law. 

Eespectfully  submitted. 

W.  P.  Borland,  Director. 


WASHINGTON'  :  GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE  :  1925 


Ilpii 

J  1262  08856  5378 


